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. However, responsibility for the basic function of what may be termed 'the protection and preservation of civil life and property', in both peace and war, rests with the States. Thus the agencies charged with exercising this function -the police forces, fire services, ambulance and volunteer emergency services and the like -are essentially State agencies.
In the 1930s, the worsening international situation led to a series of Premiers' Conferences which agreed on the need for coordination of Commonwealth and State activities in the area of civil defence (matters involving the protection of the civil population and of essential civil services in time of war). As a result, Australia entered the Second World War with, by international standards of the time, a relatively sophisticated civil defence system. Fortunately, the wartime civil defence arrangements did not have to be put heavily to the test, and in 1945 War Cabinet decided that post-war the volunteer civil defence organisations in the States, the ACT and the Northern Territory 2 should be retained on a planning and reserve basis.
Over the next twenty years, the fortunes of these small residual planning bodies and volunteer units, usually the responsibility of the Chief Secretary's Department or equivalent at State level, waxed and waned in tune with the highs and lows of the 'Cold War' period, with a limited degree of support from a Directorate of Civil Defence in Canberra, as part of the Federal Government's Department of the Interior.
Increasingly, however, the small local units, often with vehicles and equipment of Second World War vintage, were being called upon to assist their communities in a variety of non-war events -floods, windstorms, cyclones, transport accidents, fires, building collapses and other civil emergencies. In 1972, New South Wales was the first State to give a clear legislative cover to such activities, in its State Emergency Services and Civil Defence Act. Until this time, however, there had been no discernible move towards the establishment of any national emergency management organisation or coordination structure for dealing with nondefence emergencies. 
A seminal event
In early February 1967, southern Tasmania (including the Hobart area) was impacted by a series of major bushfires. Sixty-two people died, over 1300 homes and other properties were destroyed, and total damages were estimated in the order of $300 million in 1997 values. In the words of an observer at the time, 'Hobart was grossly illprepared' (Wettenhall 1975) and the initial response to the event was patently inadequate (although the recovery effort was quite well handled, with Commonwealth support). As it happened, the State's small Civil Defence Directorate and some of its volunteer units played a significant role in response management and community support.
Significantly, the issue of the possible establishment of a national disaster fund and organisation 'similar to those operating in New Zealand, Canada and the United States' (Wettenhall 1975 p.181 ) was raised in the federal parliamentary session in late February, immediately after the fires, by Lance Barnard, Member for Bass (Northern Tasmania) and newly-elected Deputy Leader of the federal Labor opposition.
In December 1972, a federal Labor government came to power in Canberra, with a defence platform which included a responsibility for 'the financing of a civil emergency service … within the Department of Defence' (Ball and Langtry 1984) . On 19 December 1972 Lance Barnard, as the new Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, issued a public statement concerning the reorganisation of the Commonwealth Department of Defence which included the transfer of the Civil Defence Directorate from the Department of the Interior to the Department of Defence and a commitment to the later creation of a 'National Disaster Organisation … to cope, in co-operation with other civil authorities in Australia, with the effects of natural disasters' (Vardenega 1978 In selecting Queensland cyclones for early study and exercises and undertaking preliminary planning for the possible isolation of Darwin, NDO had unwittingly picked both a likely initiating event and a potential location and outcome -an excellent future exercise scenario. However, tropical cyclone Tracy was not just an exercise!
NDO on the eve of tropical cyclone Tracy
In December 1974, a bare two years after the Commonwealth government's announcement of the intended creation of a new federal emergency coordination body and just six months after basic agreements had been reached with the States, the members of the new organisation could face the upcoming Christmas break with some sense of satisfaction.
At its formation, the Natural Disasters Organisation had inherited from the old Directorate of Civil Defence a range of Commonwealth programs aimed at enhancing State and Territory civil defence capacity, including an equipment support program, a training program offered through the Australian Civil Defence School at Mount Macedon in Victoria, the preparation, production and distribution of training handbooks and pamphlets for civil defence staffs and the general public, the maintenance of two emergency broadcasting stations (one at Emu Plains in New South Wales and the other at Berry Springs just outside Darwin) 3 It is unclear why the term 'Natural' now replaced the original 'National' in the title of the new organisation. There have been suggestions that it was done to avoid the perception of some form of Commonwealth takeover of State responsibilities. As one of the first activities undertaken by NDO involved national preparedness for a satellite re-entry it rapidly became obvious that the title was inapt, but it was not until January 1993 that NDO was redesignated as EMA (Emergency Management Australia). and a number of fallout shelter survey teams operating in various State capitals.
A number of new programs had been promised to or agreed with the States early in 1974, including the development of the National Emergency Operations Centre to provide information and coordination during emergencies requiring Commonwealth support, a salary reimbursement scheme for permanent regional staffs of State and Territory voluntary Emergency Service Organisations, a range of subsidies for certain headquarters and for the construction of levee banks and fire breaks, and a number of other new initiatives.
Inevitably, at the end of its first six months of operation, given the need for resolving a number of policy and coordination issues with the States and Territories and with other Commonwealth agencies and the organisation's own budgetary, staffing and resource limitations, there were still a number of outstanding issues and some programs were having teething problems (indeed, a few programs did not survive into 1975). But there had been measurable progress in key policy development, planning and program areas, and operational arrangements seemed to be well in hand. However, other than in a relatively short-time exercise simulation context, the NEOC had not been fully put to the test, and this would clearly be a priority in the new year. In the first 24 hours, communications with Darwin were tenuous, conducted often through relays by ships and aircraft (only later was it discovered that throughout the whole period a direct communications link had existed by means of a PMG 'order wire'). The lack of 'hard information' on conditions and needs in Darwin was an early concern, one attempted remedy being the organisation of an RAAF photoreconnaissance flight covering the entire Darwin area. The NEOC experienced the phenomenon of 'convergence', with requests for information and offers of assistance coming from all sources and from every level, and the organisation was handicapped by its limited capacity and the simple fact of having to commence operations on Christmas Day.
By the following day (Boxing Day), communications with Darwin had improved substantially, and the needs of the affected administration and community had become clearer -on this day it became apparent that a major evacuation of Darwin's population would be needed. In round terms, Darwin's population on Christmas Day was around 45 000; it became obvious that given constraints imposed by distance, infrastructure capacity and resource and transport capability, only some 10 000 people could be maintained in Darwin in the short-to-medium term and thus some 35 000 people would need to be evacuated. In the event, some 10 000 voluntarily evacuated by road to the south and east, but air evacuation would be needed for roughly 25 000 people.
On Friday 27 December NDO was represented at a meeting in Canberra called by the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet to consider relief measures and general coordination. Such meetings continued on at least a daily basis up to the disengagement of NDO on 3 January, and procedures and organisational arrangements were modified progressively as the Departments of the Northern Territory and Social Security accepted an increased role.
NEOC capacity had been supplemented with additional staff, systems and liaison groups, and was able to consolidate its activities around three central concerns -the coordination of relief support, the coordination of transport and the evacuation program. In regard to the last, the NEOC prepared plans for the movement, reception and accommodation of evacuees, the Commonwealth Department of Social Security accepted coordination responsibility for evacuee reception and registration, and State organisations (together with the Red Cross) accepted a major role in the reception and accommodation of evacuees. Over five and a half days, commencing at 7 am on Friday 27 December, 25 000 people were evacuated by air, the peak being reached on 28 December when 8200 were flown out, including 694 passengers plus crew on one Boeing 747 configured for 365! 
Meanwhile, in Darwin…
As mentioned earlier, the threat early in December of the isolation of Darwin by flooding had led to considerable planning in both Canberra and Darwin, and as part of that planning at the Darwin end a number of emergency committees to deal with such matters as law and order, communications, works, food etc. had been authorised and set up by mid-December. Mid-afternoon on Christmas Day a senior member of the Northern Territory administration, Mr Ray McHenry, called a meeting of the chairpersons of these committees and other administration officials to identify immediate issues and priorities.
Early on Boxing Day this group met with the newly-arrived Minister and Director-General NDO and it was agreed that the immediate priorities were health, communications, restoration of water and essential services, and evacuation. During the height of the emergency and up to Sunday 29 December, Major-General Stretton would meet twice daily with the committee chairs to resolve policy matters, set priorities and establish necessary coordination and resource support arrangements. At one stage, there were 24 separate committees in action, ranging alphabetically from 'aboriginal welfare' to 'works and services'.
On Monday 30 December, with Darwin's population having been voluntarily reduced to an estimated 11 000 and water and some other essential services having been restored to parts of the city, the arrival of major units of the Royal Australian Navy signalled the real beginning of the clean-up and eventual recovery. The following day, Tuesday 31 December, Major-General Stretton handed over his responsibilities to the administrator and flew back south.
The final civil charter flight with evacuees left Darwin on the Wednesday, New Years Day, and on the morning of Friday 3 January 1975, final arrangements for the restoration and recovery phase having been established and the scheduled civil air services having been restored (although inbound passengers still required entry permits), a message from the National Emergency Operations Centre in Canberra to all departments notified the formal disengagement of the Natural Disaster Organisation from the 'Darwin Relief Operation'.
A little over ten days after the onset of tropical cyclone Tracy, the emergency response and relief phase in Darwin could be regarded as having been reasonably satisfactorily concluded. The rehabilitation and reconstruction of Darwin itself would clearly take a lot longer.
Some conclusions and observations
The key lessons learned Clearly, the major lesson to be learned from tropical cyclone Tracy, as far as NDO was concerned, was that it needed to re-think its basic assumption that the organisation would 'control' the national response to a major emergency or disaster (whether 'natural' in origin or not). If the event was to occur in a State, it would be that State which would determine what needed to be done to manage that event; the Commonwealth could provide assistance, support and even advice, but ultimately the key response and immediate relief decisions (for example, on the need for evacuation) would need to be made by the State. Even when the event occurred in what was, at the time, a Commonwealth Territory, it was clear that Canberra could not override the authority and responsibility of those 'on the ground' in Darwin and needed to depend upon the local assessments of needs and priorities in providing timely response and relief assistance and support. (A qualification here -when it comes to longer-term post-event re-establishment and recovery programs, by virtue of its control of the national pursestrings and its access to the widest range of expertise, the Commonwealth's ability and capability to exert increased influence, if not absolute control, is undoubted, but not necessarily and ultimately for the better, as the record of the Darwin Reconstruction Commission may attest)
A corollary to this basic lesson was the requirement to re-jig the National Emergency Operations Centre (NEOC) structure and operating procedures. Fundamentally, the NEOC was in the business of providing a communications and coordinating centre for dealing with requests for assistance, with establishing arrangements to coordinate the identification, marshalling and provision of the needed assistance, and with keeping government and the national community informed of what was going on 5 . An urgent redesign of the NEOC, focussing on its information management systems and displays, its communications links (in particular those with key government and nongovernment support agencies), its staffing arrangements and its public information and media relations systems, was undertaken immediately after tropical cyclone Tracy.
During the operation, a number of problems had been identified in relation to the management of the evacuation process and to arrangements for the reception of evacuees.
Responsibilities for the registration and tracing of evacuees and the related issue of the handling of inquiries about possible victims and evacuees varied between States, and because of the speed and nature of the Darwin evacuation (in many cases registration could only be undertaken in flight or on arrival at an interim destination) the registration process itself was clearly in need of major review. Responsibility for the coordination of reception and accommodation arrangements for evacuees was accepted by the Commonwealth Department of Social Security, and multi-agency reception committees were established in all States and the ACT to ensure the payment of appropriate benefits and to arrange any necessary on-movement or 5 Jeff Kennett, as Premier of Victoria during the 1998 crisis caused by the explosion at the gas-producing facility at Longford in Gippsland, established some useful public information benchmarks, such as insisting that (a) all government information, during such a crisis, needed to be centrally-managed and consistent, and (b) all public information bulletins should address 'what has happened, what we've done about it, what we are doing about it right now, and how you (the public) can assist'. temporary accommodation. In all, between 15 000 and 20 000 evacuees made use of the services provided by these committees, and a number of studies of the issues raised in the evacuation and immediate post-disaster relief arrangements were undertaken by NDO as a matter of urgency.
There were many other lessons arising from the NDO and NEOC experience during tropical cyclone Tracy, and these were progressively addressed in ensuing years in intergovernment committees and forums and through workshops and study periods conducted at NDO's research, education and training facility, the Australian Counter Disaster College (now the Emergency Management Australia Institute) at Mount Macedon in Victoria.
Evaluating the effectiveness of the response Other than for the brief formal report on the relief operation written in February 1975 by Major-General Stretton and published by the Department of Defence (Major-General Stretton, 1975 ) and a small number of reports and Cabinet records maintained by National Archives Australia, and while there has been a plethora of academic papers, published personal records and reminiscences, there has been very little recorded official evaluation of the effectiveness of the national response to the impact of cyclone Tracy on Darwin 6 . There was some controversy over aspects of the response, such as the management of the few reported cases of theft and the need for evacuation (although this action was agreed by Northern Territory authorities themselves, primarily on medical, public health and community safety grounds, and it is noteworthy that there was no forcible evacuation). It is significant, however, that the relief mission, conducted as it was over a vast distance and in most difficult conditions, was accomplished without any further loss of life.
Postscript
In January 1975, while NDO was still involved in winding down its Darwin support effort, the bulk carrier MV Lake Illawarra brought down the Tasman Bridge in Hobart, resulting in the loss of twelve lives and effectively dividing Hobart in two. While NDO's direct role in the response to this event was minimal, it provided the vehicle through which the Commonwealth assisted in re-establishing communications and transport links. And in quick succession during 1975 NDO was involved in the responses to major floods in New South Wales and tropical cyclone Joan in north-western Western Australia, while 1976 saw more storms in New South Wales and tropical cyclone Ted in Queensland. January 1977 saw the Granville train accident in New South Wales, demonstrating yet again (if further proof were needed after the Tasman Bridge collapse) that 'natural disasters' were not the only ones of concern to NDO.
Later, NDO's charter was extended to address overseas disaster planning and relief operations, and accordingly it has been directly involved in coordinating the national relief responses to regional disaster events such as tsunamis and volcanic eruptions and in facilitating the evacuation of Australian nationals and others in security crises in the region. In January 1993 NDO was formally redesignated Emergency Management Australia.
Currently it is administratively located in the Attorney-General's Department, although its future portfolio identification is likely to await the outcome of the government's review of the proposal to establish a Department of Homeland Security or equivalent.
A final observation -the forgotten road element of the Darwin evacuation.
While it is officially recorded that some 9700 people evacuated Darwin by road, mainly through Queensland and South Australia, the true number will never be known. A number of people simply 'took off' on Christmas Day, in all sorts of vehicles in a variety of states of roadworthiness, and it was only on the following day that arrangements were put in hand in Darwin to establish check-points to record details, ensure sufficient fuel and supplies were carried and provide other assistance. Tropical cyclone Tracy itself complicated the process, dumping quantities of rain over the inland and causing considerable concern for some days. The NEOC in Canberra coordinated action between a number of Commonwealth and State departments and regional authorities, police forces and other emergency service and voluntary agencies to ensure that evacuees could be helped on their way to their final destinations.
An ironical consequence of this has been that while a local census in Darwin on 31 December found that on this day the population of the city had been reduced to 10 638, because of the uncertainty in the actual number of evacuees from Darwin (and an influx of support personnel over the period) the estimate of a 45 000 population in Darwin on the eve of the cyclone is indeed only a rough estimate.
